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Non-technical Summary 
The aim of this paper is to analyze consumer acceptance of genetically modified (GM) foods 
in Germany and the impact of different labeling schemes on the ability of consumers to 
express their preferences for GM foods. For this purpose we conducted a laboratory 
experiment with a sample of the resident population of Mannheim, Germany. Overall, 164 
subjects took part in the experiment. Participants bid in real auctions for GM and non-GM 
food products. The results show that consumers demonstrably favor non-GM over GM foods 
and require an average price discount of approximately 50 % to buy GM foods. Thus, if 
properly discounted from their non-GM counterparts, GM foods can find purchasers in the 
German food market. Consumers’ preferences appear to be relatively stable with respect to 
the level of information. Reading neutral information about potential costs and benefits of 
using biotechnology in food production does not change consumers’ aversion to GM food.  
Since GM content cannot be identified by consumers through taste or appearance, without 
labeling consumers will not have enough information to express their true preferences for this 
attribute in their purchasing behavior. However, the choice of the labeling scheme, mandatory 
or voluntary, is a highly controversial issue. Opponents of the voluntary labeling scheme for 
genetically modified food products often argue that consumers have the “right to know” and 
therefore advocate mandatory labeling. Our results make a case against this line of reasoning. 
When a second (redundant) label which indicates that a product is GM-free enters the market 
consumers lose trust in the mandatory labeling scheme. This means that both labeling 
schemes generate uncertainty among consumers and therefore do not enable consumers to 
express their preferences for GM foods. There are, in principle, two possibilities of reducing 
the observed uncertainty in the mandatory labeling scheme. The first option is to enhance 
consumers’ confidence in food labeling through a specific information policy. The second 
option is to introduce a uniform labeling rule for all GM-free products.  
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Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht, ob genetisch veränderte Lebensmittel in Deutschland eine 
Absatzchance haben und ob die unterschiedlichen Kennzeichnungssysteme, freiwillig oder 
verpflichtend, es den Konsumenten ermöglichen, ihre Präferenzen zu offenbaren. Zu diesem 
Zweck haben wir ein Laborexperiment mit einer Stichprobe der Mannheimer Bevölkerung 
durchgeführt. Insgesamt nahmen 164 Personen an dem Experiment teil. Im Mittelpunkt der 
Untersuchung standen Auktionen, in denen die Teilnehmer reale Kaufgebote für Lebensmittel 
mit genetisch veränderten und nicht veränderten Inhaltsstoffen abgaben. Die Ergebnisse 
zeigen, dass die Teilnehmer die nicht genetisch veränderten Lebensmittel deutlich 
bevorzugen. Im Durchschnitt verlangen sie einen Preisabschlag von etwa 50 %, um genetisch 
veränderte Lebensmittel zu kaufen. Demnach haben genveränderte Lebensmittel durchaus 
eine Absatzchance in Deutschland, sofern sie deutlich billiger sind als die konventionell 
erzeugten Produkte. In unserer Untersuchung waren die Zahlungsbereitschaften der 
Teilnehmer für die Produkte relativ stabil. Eine neutrale Information über potentielle Vor- und 
Nachteile der Nutzung von Biotechnologie in der Lebensmittelproduktion hat die 
Zahlungsbereitschaften der Konsumenten nicht signifikant beeinflusst. 
Da die Konsumenten die Existenz genveränderter Inhaltsstoffe nicht am Aussehen oder am 
Geschmack der Lebensmittelprodukte erkennen können, ist ein Kennzeichnungssystem 
erforderlich, um die Konsumenten über die Existenz oder auch Nichtexistenz solcher Zutaten 
zu informieren und es ihnen zu ermöglichen, ihre Präferenzen durch ihr Kaufverhalten 
auszudrücken. Strittig ist allerdings, welches der beiden möglichen Kennzeichnungssysteme, 
freiwillig oder verpflichtend, für diesen Zweck besser geeignet ist. Gegner der freiwilligen 
Kennzeichnung argumentieren häufig, Konsumenten hätten das „Recht zu Wissen“ und 
fordern die verpflichtende Kennzeichnung aller genetisch veränderten Lebensmittel. Bei einer 
verpflichtenden Kennzeichnung müssen alle genveränderten Produkte als solche 
gekennzeichnet sein. Demnach enthält ein Produkt ohne eine solche Kennzeichnung keine 
genveränderten Inhaltsstoffe. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen jedoch, dass diese Argumentation 
unter bestimmten Umständen nicht zielführend ist. Wenn am Markt ein zweites (redundantes) 
Kennzeichen vorhanden ist, welches ein Produkt als explizit nicht genverändert ausweist, 
verlieren die Konsumenten das Vertrauen in die verpflichtende Kennzeichnung. Das heißt, 
beide Kennzeichnungssysteme, freiwillig und verpflichtend, erzeugen Unsicherheit bei den 
Konsumenten und ermöglichen es ihnen nicht, ihre tatsächlichen Präferenzen zu offenbaren. 
Für die Politik bedeutet dies, dass entweder das Vertrauen der Konsumenten in die 
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existierende Kennzeichnungspflicht erhöht oder eine einheitliche Kennzeichnungsregelung 
für nicht genveränderte Produkte eingeführt wird. 
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1. Introduction 
The introduction of genetically modified (GM) content in food products has been the object of 
highly controversial debates in several countries for over a decade. Opponents, such as 
Greenpeace International, warn against potential dangers to the environment and human 
health that arise from growing and consuming GM crop (e.g. Greenpeace International 2008). 
They emphasize unknown health risks, such as allergic reactions, and environmental risks, 
such as pest resistance and loss of biodiversity, and denounce the absence of long-term studies 
investigating those risks. On the other hand, proponents, such as the Council for 
Biotechnology Information, believe that the approval process in place for the 
commercialization of GM foods can be trusted and that GM crops can have positive 
environmental impacts due to reduced pesticide and herbicide use, positive social impacts due 
to an increase in farmland productivity and positive health impacts, since they reduce farmers’ 
exposure to toxic substances, especially in developing countries (e.g. Council for 
Biotechnology Information 2008). 
The distribution of conflicting pieces of information by the biotechnology industry on the one 
hand and environmental groups on the other hand increases consumers’ fears, thus leading to 
continuous resistance to the products of agricultural biotechnology. This phenomenon can be 
observed not only in countries with a low rate of adoption of GM crops, such as European 
countries, but – albeit to a lower extent – also in countries that are large GM adopters such as 
the United States. Consumers’ resistance continues to be observed although several 
scientifically grounded opinions from the European Food and Safety Authority (EFSA) state 
that GM products are “unlikely to have any adverse effect on human and animal health or on 
the environment in the context of its intended uses” (EFSA 2007, p. 2).  
Given the marked contrast between scientific judgement and public opinion on GM foods, 
politics is facing the huge problem of how to regulate this market. There are mainly three 
options (Noussair et al. 2008): (i) banning GM foods, (ii) allowing GM foods without 
segregation from their conventional counterparts and (iii) allowing GM foods with 
segregation from their conventional counterparts. The first two policies have serious potential 
drawbacks. Banning GM products may be inefficient as potential welfare gains from the use 
of biotechnology will not be realized. On the other hand, allowing the introduction of GM 
foods into the food chain without segregation reduces consumer choice and, given consumers’ 
strong resistance, may cause the collapse of entire market segments. The third option implies 
the creation of two separate production tracks and the introduction of a labeling scheme 
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allowing consumers to choose between GM and non-GM food products. The underlying 
motivation of a labeling scheme in this case is to avoid adverse selection due to asymmetric 
information (Caswell and Mojduska 1996, Golan et al. 2001). Since GM content is a credence 
attribute that cannot be identified by consumers through taste or appearance, without labeling 
consumers will not have enough information to express their true preferences for this attribute 
in their purchasing behavior. While segregation and labeling of GM products is beyond 
dispute the choice of labeling scheme, mandatory or voluntary, is a highly controversial issue, 
and its dimensions increase proportionally to the spread of GM products into the food chain. 
Some countries, such as the U.S. and Canada, have opted for a voluntary labeling scheme 
arguing that the market will offer the right labeling incentives and produce the optimal degree 
of segregation among products without the unnecessary costs a mandatory scheme would 
imply. Other countries, such as European Union member states, Australia, New Zealand and 
Japan opted for a mandatory labeling scheme arguing that consumers have the right to know. 
A basic difference between voluntary labeling and mandatory labeling is in the amount of 
labeling and segregation costs they generate. While under a mandatory labeling scheme all 
products must be tested, under a voluntary labeling scheme only producers who want to place 
a label on their products need testing. Economic arguments in favor of voluntary labeling are 
based on this difference. In Germany, as in most other countries with mandatory labeling 
schemes, GM-labeled products are virtually nonexistent. In countries with voluntary labeling 
schemes GM products are available but they are unlabeled and therefore indistinguishable 
from their conventional counterparts. In both situations, researchers wanting to investigate 
consumer preferences in relation to GM products have to rely on data derived from stated-
preference surveys or laboratory experiments. Laboratory experiments in particular are an 
appropriate tool because this methodology confronts participants with real purchase decisions 
and provides a controlled environment to measure individual preferences (e.g. Shogren 2005). 
Experimental studies allow, for example, controlling for information given about product 
characteristics, the direct comparison of different labeling schemes for GM foods and the 
factoring out of variety effects that may bias the results (Scatasta et al. 2007), which is not 
possible in the field. 
In this paper we use laboratory experiments to investigate (i) consumers acceptance of “first 
generation” GM foods1 in Germany, (ii) the effect of neutral information on consumer 
acceptance of GM foods, (iii) the existence of a hypothetical bias when consumer preferences 
                                                 
1 The benefits of “first generation” GM products are primarily agronomic through the reduction of costs or 
losses, whereas “second generation” GM products directly benefit the consumer through enhanced product 
characteristics. See Gaisford et al. (2001). 
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are elicited in the absence of an actual purchase, and (iv) the impact of different labeling 
schemes on the ability of consumers to express their preferences for GM foods. For this 
purpose we conducted experimental auctions for GM and non-GM food products with a 
random sample of the resident population of Mannheim, Germany. Participants in our sample 
generally preferred non-GM to GM products and discounted GM food products between 47 % 
and 59 %. We contribute to the empirical literature on the existence of hypothetical bias 
finding a significant upward bias in valuations elicited in a hypothetical scenario. We do not 
find significant impacts of neutral information on consumer valuation of GM products. 
Finally, our analysis suggests that under mandatory labeling consumers seem to lose trust in 
the labeling scheme when a second redundant (GM-free) label enters the market. In other 
words, the quality signaling in a mandatory labeling scheme depends on the number of labels 
in the market. This effect has not been investigated in the existing literature. Further research 
should be carried out on this subject, given that, in Europe, both labels (GM and GM-free) are 
readily observable in the market. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short review of the relevant literature. In 
section 3 we describe the design and the implementation of the experiment. In section 4 we 
explain the hypotheses regarding the expected behavior of subjects. Section 5 presents the 
results and section 6 summarizes our findings and concludes.  
 
2. Background 
Reviewing the literature on consumers’ preferences for GM food we are able to identify the 
following stylized facts. Firstly, consumers normally value non-GM foods higher than GM 
foods. They only value the presence of GM ingredients when it comes along with certain 
benefits, e.g. increased shelf life or better taste (e.g. Noussair et al. 2002, Loureiro and 
Bugbee 2005). Secondly, the WTP varies with country or region. Lusk et al. (2003, 2004), for 
instance, show that there are not only considerable differences between U.S. and European 
consumers but also between European countries. Thirdly, the WTP varies with product and 
type of genetic modification. For example, the aversion to GM foods is higher when animal 
genes are involved (e.g. James and Burton 2003, Kaneko 2005). Fourthly, attitudinal 
variables, such as concerns for health and environment, generally seem to be more important 
for the valuation of GM foods than socioeconomic variables, such as gender or age (e.g. Chen 
and Chern 2002, Kimenju and De Groote 2008). Finally, the comparison of different 
valuation methods suggests that there is some disparity depending on whether consumers are 
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confronted with hypothetical questions or real purchase decisions (Noussair et al. 2001, Lusk 
2003). This supports the finding that hypothetical surveys place respondents in the role of an 
ethical observer judging matters from society’s point of view rather than in the role of a 
consumer who makes individual purchase decisions.  
Polls among German consumers confirm a very high degree of hostility to the use of genetic 
modification in the nation’s food supply (GfK 2007, BMU 2006, COM 2006, forsa 2005). 
Quantitative stated-preference surveys confirm this result (Gath and Alvensleben 1998, Lusk 
et al. 2003). To our knowledge, however, there has been no experimental study in Germany 
that confronted the participants with real purchase decisions on GM and non-GM products. 
Furthermore there is no study that investigates whether and how German consumers respond 
to neutral information about potential costs and benefits of GM food. In our opinion this is a 
very interesting question due to the fact that the German mass media do not provide a 
balanced dispute about risks and chances of GM foods but rather focus on spectacular actions 
and campaigns of some environmental groups.2  
While the need for a labeling scheme for GM foods is beyond dispute, the choice of the 
scheme is highly controversial. A label can be considered a market product for which 
consumers are willing to pay a premium and producers have to sustain a certain amount of 
costs to supply. If the market for such a label has no failures, voluntary labeling will produce 
the socially optimal outcome. Imposing mandatory labeling in this situation would impose 
unnecessary labeling and testing costs to society (Giannakas and Fulton 2002, Huffman et al. 
2002, Bansal and Ramaswami 2007). Only a market failure in this market would justify 
government intervention in the form of a mandatory labeling regime. Veyssiere and 
Giannakas (2006) identify two sources of market failure: weakness or lack of intellectual 
property rights and market power of life science companies. Huffman et al. (2002) suggest 
instead imperfect quality signals of the labeling scheme. Using experimental auctions with 
only one label in the market they find that consumers can accurately read the signals under 
both labeling schemes and therefore conclude that the voluntary labeling scheme leads to 
higher social welfare. Several theoretical studies assign the optimal choice of labeling 
scheme, among other factors, to the degree of consumer aversion to GM products (Crespi and 
Marette 2003, Fulton and Giannakas 2004, Veyssiere and Giannakas 2006). Therefore a 
regulator who tries to maximize social welfare by choosing the appropriate policy design 
needs to know consumer preferences in relation to GM foods.  
                                                 
2 In September 2006, for instance, Greenpeace caused quite a stir with the detection of unlicensed GM rice in a 
large German supermarket (SZ 2006). 
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3. The experiment 
This section presents the experimental procedure. It describes at first the auction mechanism. 
Descriptions of the concrete implementation and the design of the treatments follow. 
 
Auction Mechanism 
Experimental studies have employed a wide variety of incentive compatible mechanisms to 
elicit willingness-to-pay (WTP) for goods. Thereby, a mechanism is considered as incentive 
compatible if an individual’s dominant strategy is to bid in such a manner that valuations are 
truthfully revealed. For example, the following incentive compatible procedures have been 
used in recent literature: Vickrey 2nd price auction (e.g. Noussair et al. 2002, Hayes et al. 
1995), random nth price auction (e.g. List 2003, Huffman et al. 2007), and Becker-deGroot-
Marschak mechanism (e.g. Noussair et al. 2004, Lusk and Fox 2003). In our study, we 
decided to use the Vickrey 2nd price auction (Vickrey 1961). In this auction, each subject 
simultaneously submits a sealed bid to purchase a good. The agent who submits the highest 
bid wins the auction, and pays an amount equal to the second highest bid among the bidders 
in the auction. The other bidders do not receive items and pay zero. Selecting the mechanism 
to elicit individuals’ WTP, we had to account for the heterogeneity of the subject pool in our 
experiment. In particular, we had to ensure that the mechanism rules are comprehensible also 
to people who are not familiar with the rather artificial decision situation in the experiment. 
For our experiment, the 2nd price auction seems to be appropriate, as this mechanism is 
relatively simple and creates an endogenous price within a transparent competitive 
environment. In order to avoid the influence of possibly affiliated beliefs on subjects’ bids 
(Harrison et al. 2005) we allowed only for one-shot bidding on a single product. 
 
Implementation 
For subject recruitment 2000 residents, randomly drawn from the telephone book of 
Mannheim, had been called and asked to take part in the experiment. In addition, around 2000 
letters of invitation had been randomly distributed in the city centre. The information people 
had got at this stage was that there would be a form of survey in which they could buy 
products and that they would receive a show-up fee of € 50.00. We used a relatively high 
show-up fee in order to avoid underrepresentation of people with high opportunity costs of 
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time. The experiment took place in November 2007 on the premises of the Centre for 
European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, Germany. A total of 164 participants 
took part in the experiment. At the beginning of each session participants individually drew 
lots to determine their ID number (which was kept private) and chose a table. The tables had 
screens on every side to ensure private answers. Participants were not allowed to talk to each 
other. If they had questions, the experimenter answered them privately.  
Experimental sessions lasted between 40 and 70 minutes. At first, all participants obtained 
detailed instructions3 about the course of the experiment and, in case of the auction treatments 
(see next section), guidance for the 2nd price auction. Participants in the auction treatments 
additionally saw a presentation of a concrete example of the 2nd price auction and had to fill 
out a short quiz that checked their comprehension. Before they bid for the products of interest, 
namely the GM and non-GM foods, they bid for chewing gums and cookies. Although 
participants did not know, the purpose of these auctions was solely to understand and exercise 
the auction mechanism. The results of the try-out auctions, namely the bids of all participants 
as well as the ID number of the winner and the price to be paid, were written on a blackboard. 
The presentation of the concrete example as well as the try-out auctions included all features 
that were relevant for the proper auctions. Participants in all treatments filled out a two-part 
questionnaire, one part before the auction – or respectively the collection of hypothetical 
WTP – and the other part afterwards. The first part contained questions about their socio-
economic characteristics and questions about general consumption habits. The second part 
consisted of questions about their attitude toward GM foods and several other qualities of 
food products as well as questions about their state of knowledge concerning GM foods. 
Participants also had the chance to comment on the experiment and to give reasons for their 
bidding behavior. 
For GM and non-GM foods products we took soy bean oil and chocolate bars. We had to use 
products that are available in a GM and non-GM version and, moreover, both versions should 
look similar and contain the same ingredients. We bought GM soy bean oil in Asian shops in 
Germany where it is labeled as such according to the EU mandatory labeling scheme. Non-
GM soy bean oil, equal to the GM oil in terms of appearance, quantity and ingredients, is 
available in several German supermarkets. The GM chocolate bar was a chocolate bar from 
the United States. Due to the U.S. voluntary labeling scheme it was not labeled as GM but 
                                                 
3 The instructions were based on the instructions used by Rousu et al. (2007) and changed for our purposes. They 
are available (in German) on request. 
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several indications led us to assume that it contained GM ingredients.4 The non-GM chocolate 
bar was very similar in terms of appearance, quantity and ingredients. Prior to the auctions or 
respectively the collection of the hypothetical WTP the products were given to participants 
who could examine them and read the labels. We removed the original label and in the case of 
the chocolate bar also the original packing and affixed our own labels which varied between 
treatments. The labels in the four auction treatments always gave the type of product 
(chocolate bar or soy bean oil), the quantity and the ingredients. In most of our treatments (see 
next section) they included also the information whether or not the product contained GM 
ingredients. Participants were not allowed to open the packing or taste the foods. After each 
auction products were recollected. When participants had finished the second part of the 
questionnaire we asked them to individually leave the room. Outside each participant received 
his or her show up fee. People who had purchased products by auction got their product(s) 
and paid the price.  
 
Treatments 
Our experiment contains five different treatments: four auction treatments, named “Baseline”, 
“Info”, “Mandatory” and “Voluntary”, in which products were sold in real auctions and one 
hypothetical treatment, named “Hypothetical”, in which participants did not buy any goods 
but only gave their hypothetical WTP. In the following we describe the five treatments in 
more detail (see Figures 2 – 5 in the appendix). In the Baseline treatment participants first bid 
on the GM soy bean oil and the GM chocolate bar (round 1) and afterwards on the non-GM 
version of both products (round 2).5 All products in this treatment had labels including the 
information whether or not it contained GM ingredients. In order to avoid saturation effects 
only one of both rounds was binding, i.e. people could win at most one chocolate bar or one 
bottle of soy bean oil. The Info treatment was the very same except that before the auctions 
participants received a sheet containing neutral information about GM food. The 
specifications derived from a U.S. study (Teisl et al. 2003) included all possible assets and 
drawbacks of the use of biotechnology in the field of food production. The sequence of the 
specification randomly varied between the sheets.  
                                                 
4 The chocolate bar is on the Greenpeace list of GM food sighted in Germany (Greenpeace 2008). Furthermore, 
the producer of the chocolate bar told us per e-mail that the company uses GM ingredients in some of its 
products. 
5 Some subjects in the Baseline and the Info treatment first obtained the non-GM products and afterwards the 
GM products so that we were able to control for sequence effects. In both treatments the comparison of subjects 
who received first the GM products with subjects who received first the non-GM products does not show 
significant differences neither for the oil nor for the chocolate bar (MWU test, p>0.05). 
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The aim of the treatments Mandatory and Voluntary was to examine the effects of different 
labeling schemes. Both treatments were conducted solely with chocolate bars and not with 
soy bean oil. The Mandatory treatment represented the situation in a mandatory labeling 
scheme. Subjects in this treatment were told in advance that they would give their auction 
bids under the conditions of a mandatory labeling scheme, i.e. that all GM products would be 
labeled as such. In the first round participants bid (in parallel) on a labeled GM chocolate bar 
(chocolate bar A) and an unlabeled non-GM chocolate bar (B). In the second round 
participants bid again on chocolate bars A and B and additionally on a labeled non-GM 
chocolate bar (C). Only one of the overall five auctions was binding so that participants could 
win at most one chocolate bar. The Voluntary treatment imitated the situation under a 
voluntary labeling scheme. Subjects in this treatment were told in advance that they would 
give their bids under the conditions of a voluntary labeling scheme, i.e. that products with GM 
ingredients need not to be labeled as such. They were additionally informed that if they 
purchased an unlabeled product, i.e. without information whether or not the product contained 
GM ingredients, at the end of the experiment they would receive the GM version (or the non-
GM respectively) by lot and the true information about the GM content. This means that to 
the time of the bidding participants did not know whether unlabeled products contained GM 
ingredients. The probability of buying a GM (or non-GM) chocolate bar was 50 %. In the first 
round of this treatment a labeled non-GM chocolate bar (A) and an unlabeled chocolate bar 
(B) were auctioned. Both chocolate bars were again auctioned in the second round besides a 
labeled GM chocolate bar (C). Only one of the five auctions was binding. The introduction of 
a third product in the Voluntary and Mandatory labeling treatments was dictated by the fact 
that in Europe we observe a proliferation of products voluntarily labeled by firms as GM-free, 
although a mandatory labeling scheme for GM products is in place. The analysis of this third 
option has not been taken into consideration in previous studies. 
The Hypothetical treatment had two objectives. The first objective was to test whether 
participants value the two chocolate bars and the two bottles of soy bean oil equally from 
appearance. This test is very important since we cannot attribute the difference in WTP 
between the two chocolate bars solely to the fact that one is GM if, for instance, people prefer 
the non-GM version merely because of its look. The two chocolate bars and the two bottles of 
oil looked very similar but they were not identical. Therefore in the first round of this 
treatment we asked subjects to give their hypothetical WTP for the two chocolate bars and the 
two bottles of soy bean oil without information except for the type of product and the 
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quantity.6 The second objective was a between-subjects test of hypothetical bias. In the 
second round of the Hypothetical treatment participants received information about the GM 
content of the chocolate bars and soy bean oil and gave again their hypothetical WTP. To 
analyze and quantify hypothetical bias these hypothetical WTP are compared with the real 
bids in the Baseline treatment.  
 
4. Hypotheses 
Considering the previous literature on preferences for GM foods and the theoretical rationale 
for labeling schemes we can derive the following hypotheses regarding the expected behavior 
of subjects in our experiment:  
 
Hypotheses 1 
a. WTP for non-GM foods is higher than WTP for GM foods. 
b. WTP in the Hypothetical treatment is higher than WTP in the Baseline treatment. 
 
Hypotheses 2 
a. Under both labeling schemes the introduction of a third product does not change the 
WTP for the two initially available products. 
b. Voluntary and mandatory labeling schemes should exhibit the same informational 
content, i.e. ceteris paribus the WTP are the same in both treatments. 
c. As in the second round of the Mandatory treatment the non-GM-labeled and the 
unlabeled product are both non-GM, the WTP for these two products should be the 
same. 
 
Regarding the effect of information on consumer behavior we are not able to formulate a 
hypothesis. Given the restricted and rather unbalanced discussion concerning the introduction 
of GM foods in Germany the effect of neutral information on consumer behavior is open. 
                                                 
6 The WTP for the two versions do not significantly differ, neither for the oil (Wilcoxon test, p=0.7634) nor for 
the chocolate bar (p=0.2429). Therefore we can assign the differences between the two versions of each product 
solely to fact that one version is GM.  
 14
However, our experiment delivers information as to what effects neutral information may 
have on different groups of consumers. 
 
5. Results 
In this section we present the results of the experiment. In the first part we describe the 
subject pool and subjects’ answers to the questionnaires. The second part presents the results 
of the conditional analysis based on non-parametric tests. Finally we show the results of the 
unconditional analysis based on linear regression models.  
 
Subject pool 
Table 1 represents participants’ socioeconomic characteristics.7 Although the subject pool 
covers all required age groups (from 18 to 75 years) for men as well as for women, it is not 
perfectly representative of the resident population of Mannheim (StaLa BWL 2007). The 
hypothesis of equal relative frequencies for male and female age groups between the subject 
pool and the resident population was rejected (chi squared test, p=0.0371). For this reason we 
will give the mean bid differences between non-GM and GM products also as weighted 
means according to the resident population.  
Participants’ responses to the questionnaires are displayed in the appendix (Tables 6 – 9). 
Almost all participants (96 %) are responsible for purchasing the groceries in their household 
or are at least considerably involved in it. Over a half (53 %) read always or often the product 
information on the package prior to the purchase. Almost two-thirds (62 %) purchase always, 
often, or sometimes food products that have just appeared in the market and over two-thirds 
(69 %) have recently acquired innovative products such as digital cameras or MP3 players. 
About a quarter (24 %) purchase always or often organic food compared to their overall food 
consumption. The information level is rather low. Only 20 % state that they are well or very 
well informed about GM foods. As expected, consumers are very skeptical of GM foods. The 
vast majority (79 %) considers the food characteristic “free of GM ingredients” to be 
important or very important and, contrary to what the EFSA has concluded about GM foods 
commercialized in Europe for human consumption, about the half think that the production 
and consumption of GM foods have highly negative effects on the environment (55 %) and on 
human health (45 %). 
                                                 
7 The data of three persons had to be left out from the analysis due to unrealistically high bids (in the 
Hypothetical treatment) or an obvious lack of understanding. The total number of observations is therefore 161. 
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Table 1: Socioeconomic characteristics of participants 
Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Gender Male 
Female 
77 
84 
47.83 
52.17 
Age 18 – 25 
26 – 40 
41 – 65 
66 – 75 
24 
57 
71 
9 
14.91 
35.40 
44.10 
5.59 
Family Status Married 
Unmarried with partner 
Single 
Other 
No answer 
39 
50 
61 
10 
1 
24.22 
31.06 
37.89 
6.21 
0.62 
Children Yes 
No 
28 
133 
17.39 
82.61 
Religion Catholic 
Evangelic 
Muslim 
Other 
No religion 
No answer 
46 
62 
5 
10 
37 
1 
28.57 
38.51 
3.11 
6.21 
22.98 
0.62 
Graduation University 
Gymnasium (12 years of education) 
Realschule (10 years of education) 
Hauptschule (9 years of education) 
Other 
No graduation 
No answer 
41 
50 
28 
20 
20 
1 
1 
25.47 
31.06 
17.39 
12.42 
12.42 
0.62 
0.62 
Nationality German 
Turkish 
Croatian 
Other 
No answer 
142 
4 
3 
11 
1 
88.20 
2.48 
1.86 
6.83 
0.62 
Household net 
income 
< 1.000 € 
1.000 – 2.500 € 
2.500 – 4.000 € 
4.000 – 5.500 € 
> 5.500 € 
No Answer 
46 
78 
26 
8 
2 
1 
28.57 
48.45 
16.15 
4.97 
1.24 
0.62 
 Σ  161 100.00 
 
 
Non-parametric tests 
Leaving out the Hypothetical treatment and omitting the data of all subjects who bid zero for 
both the GM and the non-GM version of a product leaves a total of 61 real purchase 
observations for the soy bean oil and 98 observations for the chocolate bar. In the case of the 
soy bean oil, 80 % of participants preferred the non-GM oil to the GM oil, 8 % bid more for 
the GM oil, and 12 % were indifferent between both versions. The difference between bids for 
non-GM oil and GM oil is highly significant (Wilcoxon test8, p=0.0000) and amounts on 
average to € 0.56. The weighted mean difference between non-GM and GM oil is € 0.56, too. 
                                                 
8 If not stated otherwise, all tests are two-sided. 
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As the mean bid for the non-GM oil is € 1.20 we observe that consumers demand an average 
price discount of 47 % to buy GM soy bean oil.9 
Considering the chocolate bar, 86 % of participants bid more for the non-GM version, 8 % 
preferred the GM version, and 6 % were indifferent between both versions. The bid difference 
between the non-GM chocolate bar and the GM chocolate bar is also highly significant 
(Wilcoxon test, p=0.0000). The mean bid difference is € 0.26 and the weighted mean 
difference is € 0.24. As the mean difference and the weighted mean difference between non-
GM and GM are equal or almost equal we conclude that participants’ age and gender do not 
play an important role for their acceptance of GM foods. We will return to this aspect in the 
regression analysis. For the chocolate bar consumers demand on average a price discount of 
59 % to accept GM ingredients. Hence, for both products our expectation stated in 
hypothesis 1a is fulfilled. The summary statistics for the bidding behavior are displayed in 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of bid differences between non-GM and GM products 
Treatment Baseline Info Mandatory2 Voluntary2 All real3 Hypothetical2 
No. of participants 39 44 26 26 135 26 
Oil       
   No. of observations 26 35 0 0 61 26 
   Diff. (non-GM – GM)       
Mean [€] 0.64 0.51   0.56 1.19 
Std. Dev. 0.64 0.57   0.60 1.25 
Min [€] -0.50 -0.82   -0.82 -1.00 
Max [€] 2.00 1.89   2.00 4.00 
   Discount1 0.52 0.43   0.47 0.54 
Chocolate bar       
   No. of observations 23 34 19 22 98 25 
   Diff. (non-GM – GM)       
Mean [€] 0.24 0.21 0.28 0.33 0.26 0.43 
Std. Dev. 0.21 0.22 0.52 0.30 0.31 0.39 
Min [€] 0.05 -0.10 -0.30 -0.05 -0.30 0.00 
Max [€] 0.76 0.80 2.10 0.80 2.10 1.50 
   Discount1 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.72 0.59 0.61 
Notes: 
1) Discount computed as difference (non-GM – GM) divided by non-GM. 
2) Calculation was made with bids for labeled (non-GM and GM) products. 
3) All treatments with real purchase decisions (Baseline, Info, Mandatory, and Voluntary).  
 
In order to examine whether the distribution of information about the potential costs and 
benefits of GM foods affects consumers’ acceptance of GM foods we apply a between-
                                                 
9 The market prices for the experimental products were € 1.40 for the GM chocolate bar, € 0.65 for the non-GM 
chocolate bar, € 2.29 for the GM soy bean oil and € 1.59 for the non-GM soy bean oil (all prices in € 2007). 
Interestingly the GM versions were higher in price, we assume, due to import costs and commercial structures of 
the seller. 
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subjects test comparing the bidding in the Baseline treatment with the bidding in the Info 
treatment (see Figure 1). For both products, we do not find significant differences between the 
two treatments neither for the GM versions nor the non-GM versions (MWU test, p>0.05). As 
previous experiments often showed that the impact of information depends on the subjects’ 
initial knowledge about GM foods or on their attitude toward GM foods (Lusk et al. 2004, 
Wachenheim et al. 2007) we apply additional tests using the statements participants made in 
the questionnaire.  
 
Figure 1: Mean bids in Baseline, Info and Hypothetical treatments 
 
 
The analysis shows that buyers of organic food (who always, often, or sometimes buy organic 
food) respond more to the information than non-buyers (who rarely or never buy organic 
food). After reading the information organic food buyers bid three times more (€ 1.09) for the 
GM oil than the non-buyers (€ 0.35). We can reject the hypothesis that the information affects 
buyers and non-buyers of organic food in equal measure (MWU test p=0.0149). What is 
more, organic food buyers who received the information bid significantly more for the GM oil 
than organic food buyers who did not read the information (€ 0.47) (MWU test, p=0.0263). 
This is an interesting result though we can only speculate about reasons. In Germany, 
environmental groups have effectively prevented the selling of GM foods by disseminating 
information about the risks of biotechnology. Therefore German consumers are more likely to 
be aware of potential costs rather than of potential benefits of GM foods. Hence it was 
probably the information about potential benefits that was new to our participants. Organic 
food consumers are generally anxious for a healthy and eco-friendly diet. Therefore, it might 
0.59
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be that they react more sensitively than others to the information that GM foods can also be 
beneficial to health and environment.  
We also use a between-subjects design to test for hypothetical bias. For this purpose we 
compare subjects’ bidding behavior in the Baseline treatment with subjects’ hypothetical 
statements in the second round of the Hypothetical treatment (see Figure 1). Regarding the 
two GM products we cannot reject the hypothesis that the bids in the Hypothetical treatment 
equal the real bids in the Baseline treatment (MWU test, oil: p=0.1995, chocolate bar: 
p=0.5139). In contrast, for the non-GM products the hypothetical bids significantly exceed the 
real bids (MWU test, oil: p=0.0006, chocolate bar: p=0.0092). Participants in the Hypothetical 
treatment bid on average 78 % more for the non-GM oil and 64 % more for the non-GM 
chocolate bar than participants in the Baseline treatment, which is in line with our expectation 
stated in hypothesis 1b. Hypothetical bias is often observed in the case of public goods 
(Nyborg 2000). From the viewpoint of someone who is rather skeptical of GM foods, a food 
product guaranteed free from GM ingredients can be characterized as a public good because it 
prevents society from bearing potential risks of the use of biotechnology. Participants in our 
experiment demonstrably prefer non-GM to GM foods so that it is not surprising that the 
hypothetical WTP for non-GM foods exceeds the bids in real purchase decisions. 
The treatments Mandatory and Voluntary are designed in order to investigate the effects of 
different labeling schemes. Both treatments contain two rounds of bidding. Table 3 shows the 
mean bids in both rounds of the two treatments. At first we present test results for the 
Mandatory treatment, followed by results for the Voluntary treatment and the comparison 
between the two treatments. In the first round of the Mandatory treatment bids for the GM-
labeled chocolate bar and bids for the unlabeled chocolate bar are significantly different 
(Wilcoxon test, p=0.0011). In the second round bids for all three products significantly differ 
from each other (p<0.05), although the non-GM-labeled and the unlabeled product are equal. 
This contradicts hypothesis 2c. The comparison between first and second round shows that 
the difference between first round and second round bids for the GM-labeled product is not 
significant (p=0.3173), which is in line with hypothesis 2a. In contrast, we observe significant 
differences between first round and second round bids for the unlabeled chocolate bar 
(p=0.0258), which contradicts hypothesis 2a. Differences between first round bids for the 
unlabeled chocolate bar and second round bids for the non-GM-labeled chocolate bar are 
weakly significant (p=0.0828). These results suggest that under mandatory labeling the 
presence of a product labeled as non-GM seems to shake consumers’ confidence in the 
labeling scheme. In other words, in a mandatory labeling scheme the quality of the 
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informational signal is affected by the number of labels in the market. Note that this effect 
would not emerge if subjects fully trusted the labeling scheme. 
 
Table 3: Mean bids in the Mandatory and Voluntary treatments 
Treatment Mandatory  Voluntary 
Label GM-label No label 
(non-GM) 
Non-GM-
label 
 Non-GM-
label 
No label 
(50:50) 
GM-label 
1st round [€] 0.23 0.50   0.46 0.29  
2nd round [€] 0.21 0.46 0.51  0.45 0.27 0.13  
 
Tests with the data from the Voluntary treatment show significant differences between first 
round bids for the non-GM-labeled chocolate bar and the unlabeled chocolate bar and 
significant differences between second round bids for all three products (p<0.05). Comparing 
the first with the second round displays significant differences between first round bids for the 
unlabeled chocolate bar and second round bids for the GM-labeled chocolate bar (p=0.0102). 
We do not find significant differences between first round and second round bids for the non-
GM-labeled chocolate bar (p=0.9738) as well as between first round and second round bids 
for the unlabeled chocolate bar (p=0.5640). Hence, as the introduction of a third product does 
not change the valuation of the two initially available products, subjects’ behavior in the 
Voluntary treatment is in line with hypothesis 2a. These results suggest that under a voluntary 
labeling scheme consumers are able to accurately interpret labeling signals independently 
from the number of labels. Participants on average bid the highest amount for the non-GM 
product, they bid the lowest amount for the GM product, and they value the product with 
uncertain GM content in between. As the bids for the chocolate bar with uncertain GM 
content – which is GM with a probability of 50 % – lie almost exactly between the bids for 
the GM and the non-GM chocolate bar subjects seem to be on average risk neutral.  
We now compare the bidding behavior between the two labeling schemes. Considering the 
first round we do not find significant differences between bids for the unlabeled non-GM 
product in Mandatory and the bids for the non-GM product in Voluntary (MWU test 
p=0.5818). Also in the second round we do not find significant differences between the 
labeled non-GM products (p=0.6125) and between the labeled GM products (p=0.2734). 
These results support hypothesis 2b which says that WTP for GM and non-GM products are 
the same under both labeling schemes. However, when we compare the bids for the two 
unlabeled products we find weakly significant differences in the first round (p=0.0735) but no 
significant differences in the second round (p=0.1803), although these products differ in their 
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GM content. This confirms our finding that under mandatory labeling consumers lose trust in 
the labeling scheme when a second label enters the market. 
 
Regression models 
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of a linear regression model for each product. The 
dependent variable is the (absolute) bid difference between non-GM and GM. In both models 
we display all independent variables that have at least a weakly significant influence on the 
dependent variable.  
 
Table 4: Linear regression model for soy bean oil 
Oil Coef. Robust Std. Err. P > |t| 
hypothetical 0.5265 0.2001 0.010 
age   0.0002 0.0001 0.019 
degree   0.4655 0.1636 0.006 
innovation   0.3031 0.1676 0.074 
gmo   0.4464 0.1496 0.004 
organic   0.8006 0.3006 0.009 
info_organic -1.0932 0.3913 0.007 
knowledge   0.4045 0.2025 0.049 
constant -0.4224 0.1989 0.037 
Number of obs. = 87 F (8,78) = 5.59 Prob > F = 0.0000 R-squared = 0.4264 
Estimation method: OLS. 
Variable definition: Dependent variable is the bid difference between non-GM oil and GM oil.  
Except ‘age’ all independent variables are dummy variables: 
– hypothetical: subjects in the Hypothetical treatment,  
– degree: subjects with 12 or more years of education,  
– innovation: subjects who bought recently digital camera, MP3 player or flat screen,  
– gmo: subjects who find the absence of GM ingredients important or very important,  
– organic: subjects who always or often buy organic food,  
– info_organic: organic food buyers in the Info treatment,  
– knowledge: subjects who regard themselves as well informed or very well informed about GM food.  
The price difference between non-GM and GM oil (Table 4) is significantly larger for 
individuals in the Hypothetical treatment than for the subjects in all other treatments. This 
supports our findings of the non-parametric tests regarding hypothetical bias. The price 
difference between non-GM and GM increases with age. Though this effect is statistically 
significant it is very small compared to the other effects. Furthermore, the price difference is 
larger for higher educated individuals and for people who recently bought innovative products 
such as digital cameras or MP3 players. The latter result is somewhat surprising because we 
expected those individuals to be more open-minded toward the use of biotechnology than 
others. This effect however is only weakly significant. A higher price difference between non-
GM and GM oil is furthermore found for individuals who regard the absence of GM 
ingredients to be an important food quality, for organic food buyers, and for people who 
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regard themselves as well informed about GM foods. Due to the results of the non-parametric 
test regarding the information effect we insert an interaction dummy to the regression for 
organic food buyers who received the information about the potential costs and benefits of 
GM foods. The regression model confirms that for these subjects the price difference between 
non-GM and GM is significantly lower than for organic food buyers who did not receive the 
information. Thereby the influence of information overruns the effects of organic food buying 
which in general increases the price difference. 
 
Table 5: Linear regression model for chocolate bar 
Chocolate bar Coef. Robust Std. Err. P > |t| 
hypothetical 0.1387 0.0757 0.070 
income  -0.1175 0.0632 0.065 
degree   0.1084 0.0594 0.071 
innovation   0.0908 0.5729 0.115 
organic   0.2086 0.9457 0.029 
info_organic   -0.2381 0.1246 0.059 
knowledge 0.1713 0.0935 0.069 
trust   0.1678 0.0575 0.004 
constant 0.0003 0.0702 0.996 
Number of obs. = 122 F (8,113) = 2.78 Prob > F = 0.0076 R-squared = 0.2514 
Estimation method: OLS. 
Variables definition: Dependent variable is the bid difference between non-GM chocolate bar and GM chocolate bar.  
All independent variables are dummy variables: 
– hypothetical: subjects in the Hypothetical treatment,  
– income: subjects whose net income of the household exceeds € 2500 per month, 
– degree: subjects with 12 or more years of education,  
– innovation: subjects who bought recently digital camera, MP3 player or flat screen,  
– organic: subjects who always or often buy organic food,  
– info_organic: organic food buyers in the Info treatment,  
– knowledge: subjects who regard themselves as well informed or very well informed about GM food,  
– trust: subjects who think ecological groups are trustworthy or very trustworthy and the government is hardly 
trustworthy or not trustworthy concerning their statements about GM food. 
 
The regression model for the chocolate bar (Table 5) confirms these results for subjects in the 
Hypothetical treatment, higher educated subjects, knowledgeable subjects, organic food 
buyers and organic food buyers who received the information, though most of the effects are 
only weakly significant. Other things being equal the price difference between the non-GM 
and the GM chocolate bar is lower for people with a relatively high net household income. 
This effect, too, is only weakly significant. The price difference is significantly greater for 
people who trust ecological groups and mistrust the government concerning their statements 
about GM foods. This effect is not surprising since ecological groups usually emphasize the 
risks of GM food more than the government. 
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6. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper we use laboratory experiments to investigate (i) consumers acceptance of GM 
foods in Germany, (ii) the effect of neutral information on consumer acceptance, (iii) the 
existence of a hypothetical bias when consumer preferences are elicited in the absence of an 
actual purchase, and (iv) the impact of different labeling schemes on the ability of consumers 
to express their preferences for GM foods.  
Based on elicited consumer willingness to pay for GM and non-GM soy bean oil and 
chocolate bars, our analysis concludes that residents of Mannheim, Germany, who took part 
in our experiment demonstrably favor non-GM over GM foods and require an average price 
discount of 47 – 59 % to buy GM foods. Yet, not all subjects prefer non-GM foods. Six to 
twelve percent of participants are indifferent between GM and non-GM products and 8 % 
prefer the GM version to the non-GM version. Thus, if properly discounted from their non-
GM counterparts, “first generation” GM foods could find purchasers in the German food 
market. Regression models for both products show that the (absolute) price difference 
between the non-GM and the GM version is significantly greater for highly educated 
individuals, for individuals who regard themselves as well informed about GM foods and for 
organic food buyers.  
Regarding the general attitudes of German consumers to GM foods we find it remarkable that, 
contrary to what the EFSA has concluded about GM foods commercialized in Europe for 
human consumption, 45 % respectively 55 % of participants believe GM foods have highly 
negative impacts on human health respectively on the environment. This observation suggests 
that the information policy of the EFSA and corresponding institutions in Germany was not 
successful. Only 20 % of participants feel that they are well informed about GM foods, but 
the vast majority (79 %) considers the food characteristic “free of GM ingredients” to be 
important or very important, which suggests that releasing more neutral information about 
advantages and disadvantages of using biotechnology could be welfare improving. Yet, 
reading neutral information about potential costs and benefits of GM foods does not 
significantly change consumer acceptance of GM foods in our sample. Information matters 
only to organic food buyers who bid significantly more for GM soy bean oil when given 
additional neutral information than organic food buyers who did not read information. The 
regression analysis confirms this result also for the chocolate bar, although the evidence is 
somewhat weaker in this case.  
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We find evidence in favor of an upward hypothetical bias. When asked hypothetically 
subjects bid significantly more (between 64 – 78 %) for the non-GM products than they bid in 
real purchase decisions. The hypothetical bias is also found in the regression analysis. The 
disparity between real and hypothetical bids supports the finding that hypothetical questions 
about the WTP for public goods often place respondents in the role of an ethical observer 
judging matters from a society’s point of view rather than in the role of a consumer who 
makes personal purchase decisions. Real auctions therefore appear to be more suitable to 
reveal participants’ individual preferences for environmentally relevant goods such as GM 
foods than polls or stated-preference surveys, at least for absolute estimates of the WTP.  
Regarding the bidding behavior under different labeling schemes our results support the 
findings of Huffman et al. (2002) that consumers are able to correctly read and trust labeling 
signals when the market contains only one labeled and one unlabeled product. Our paper 
contributes to the existing literature by investigating the effect of a second (redundant) label 
in a mandatory labeling scheme. Our results suggest that when such a second label enters the 
market consumers lose trust in the mandatory labeling scheme and are willing to pay more for 
the labeled non-GM product than for the unlabeled non-GM product. For producers as well as 
for regulators this may be important information. The introduction of the second label 
generates a negative externality for producers of non-GM products who market their products 
without a label. The lack of trust in the mandatory labeling scheme may also affect 
consumers’ confidence in food labeling as a whole (e.g. nutrition facts and additives), which 
represents an important public good for food manufacturers. We think that this aspect of the 
quality of informational signals generated by labeling schemes deserves further research. 
According to our results, under a voluntary labeling scheme consumers are able to correctly 
read signals independently of the presence of a second label. Consumers value unlabeled 
products, which had a 50 % chance of being GM, exactly between the value they placed on 
non-GM and GM labeled products, i.e. our values suggest average risk neutrality. We have to 
bear in mind, however, that in the Voluntary treatment the size of uncertainty is restricted in 
two ways: participants knew the probability of the unlabeled chocolate bar being GM and 
they knew they would get to know the exact GM content of the chocolate bar before eating it. 
Further research should be conducted to investigate whether the size of uncertainty about the 
quality of unlabeled products affects consumer attitudes towards risk. 
Finally, we would like to point out that reading signals of the voluntary labeling scheme 
correctly does not mean that consumers are able to express their true preferences for the actual 
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GM content of the purchased product. On the contrary, under a voluntary labeling scheme the 
true GM content of unlabeled products is either GM or non-GM. This means that consumers 
who prefer non-GM to GM products systematically undervalue the unlabeled products when 
their true content is non-GM and overvalue it when it is GM. Unfortunately, we find that the 
same is true for mandatory labeling schemes when some non-GM products are labeled as 
such. In this case consumers systematically undervalue the unlabeled product. Although the 
probability of the unlabeled product being GM in Mandatory is zero and in Voluntary is 
50 %, we do not find significant differences in the WTP across treatments. This suggests that 
both labeling schemes do not enable consumers to express their true preferences for GM 
content when the product does not carry a label. In other words, both labeling schemes 
generate uncertainty among consumers and a bias in consumer valuation. Therefore, we have 
to state that mandatory labeling does not grant consumers the right to know when there is 
more than one label in the market. Given the fact that we do observe GM-free food labels in 
Europe, where GM food products are virtually nonexistent, this result may become even more 
important when GM products will actually be offered and suppliers have more incentives to 
voluntarily label their non-GM food products. 
Summarizing, our results show that there can be significant uncertainty regarding the presence 
of GM content in unlabeled products in both labeling schemes: voluntary and mandatory. To 
reduce this uncertainty, the first option is to enhance consumers’ confidence in the mandatory 
labelling scheme through a specific and effective information policy. The second option is to 
introduce a uniform labeling rule for all GM-free products. Further research is needed to show 
which strategy is socially preferable and how such policy has to be designed. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Treatments Baseline and Info 
1. Distribution of instructions 2. Questionnaire first part 
3. Presentation of concrete example, quiz 
4. Auction 1: chewing gum A, cookies A 5. Auction 2: chewing gum B, cookies B 
6. Announcement of binding auction (1 or 2), bids, and winners 
7. Auction 3 (“round 1”):  
GM oil, GM chocolade bar 
GM GM 
8. Auction 4 (“round 2”):  
NonGM oil, NonGM chocolade bar 
NonGM NonGM 
10. Questionnaire second part 11. Payment, delivery of products 
9. Announcement of binding auction (3 or 4), bids, and winners 
Distribution of information 
Notes:  
1. Treatment Info is identical to treatment Baseline except for the fact that subjects is given information after step 6 
(indicated with dotted lines). 
2. For graphical presentation, oil is depicted as round shape and chocolate bar as rectangular shape. White indicates 
non GM products and dark gray (light gray) indicates GM products (50% probability for GM). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Treatment Hypothetical 
1. Distribution of instructions 2. Questionnaire first part 
3. Asking for (hypothetical) willingness-to-pay: 
oil A, oil B, chocolate bar A, chocolate bar B (without ingredients and labels) 
4. Asking for (hypothetical) willingness-to-pay: 
NonGM oil A, GM oil B, NonGM chocolate bar A, GM chocolate bar B 
NonGM A 
5. Questionnaire second part 6. Payment 
GM B NonGM A GM B 
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Figure 4: Treatment Mandatory 
1. Distribution of instructions 2. Questionnaire first part 
3. Presentation of concrete example, quiz 
4. Auction 1: chewing gums A and B 5. Auction 2: chewing gums A, B, and C 
6. Announcement of binding auction and product, bids, and winners 
7. Auction 3 (“round 1”): GM chocolate bar A, 
NonGM chocolate bar B (without label) 
B 
8. Auction 4 (“round 2”): GM chocolate bar A, 
NonGM chocolate bar B (without label), 
NonGM chocolate bar C 
NonGM C 
10. Questionnaire second part 11. Payment, delivery of products 
9. Announcement of binding auction and product, bids, and winners 
GM A B GM A 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Treatment Voluntary 
1. Distribution of instructions 2. Questionnaire first part 
3. Presentation of concrete example, quiz 
4. Auction 1: chewing gums A and B 5. Auction 2: chewing gums A, B, and C 
6. Announcement of binding auction and products, bids, and winners 
7. Auction 3 (“round 1”): Non GM chocolate 
bar A, 50:50 chocolate bar B (without label) 
B 
8. Auction 4 (“round 2”): Non GM chocolate 
bar A, 50:50 chocolate bar B (without label), 
GM chocolate bar C 
NonGM A GM C 
10. Questionnaire second part 11. Payment, delivery of products 
9. Announcement of binding auction and products, bids, and winners 
Non GM A B 
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Table 6: Questionnaire before auctions 
Question Answer Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
(1) Do you work in the field of agriculture, 
chemistry or in the food industry? 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
9 
150 
2 
5.59 
93.17 
1.24 
(2) Are you a member of an ecology 
group? 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
10 
150 
1 
6.21 
93.17 
0.62 
(3) In your household, are you responsible 
for purchasing the groceries or are you at 
least considerably involved in it? 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
154 
6 
1 
95.65 
3.73 
0.62 
(4) When buying food products for the first 
time, how often do you read the product 
information on the package prior to the 
purchase? 
Never 
Rarely 
Sometimes 
Often 
Always 
No answer 
5 
37 
33 
53 
33 
0 
3.11 
22.98 
20.50 
32.92 
20.50 
0 
(5) How often do you purchase organic 
foods, compared to your overall food 
consumption? 
Always 
Often 
Sometimes 
Rarely 
Never 
No answer 
1 
38 
43 
62 
15 
2 
0.62 
23.60 
26.71 
38.51 
9.32 
1.24 
(6) How often do you purchase food 
products, which have just appeared on the 
market? 
Always 
Often 
Sometimes 
Rarely 
Never 
No answer  
1 
15 
84 
58 
1 
2 
0.62 
9.32 
52.17 
36.02 
0.62 
1.24 
 ∑ 161 100.00 
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Table 7: Questionnaire after auctions – Part I 
Question Answer Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Digital camera 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
74 
82 
5 
45.96 
50.93 
3.11 
MP3-Player 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
71 
78 
12 
44.10 
48.45 
7.45 
(1) Have you or any 
other person in your 
household acquired one 
of the following products 
over the course of the 
past two years? Flat-screen 
television set 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
28 
118 
15 
17.39 
73.29 
9.32 
(2) How well informed would you estimate 
yourself to be concerning genetically 
manipulated foods?  
Very well informed 
Well informed 
Somewhat informed 
Not well informed 
Not at all informed  
I do not know 
No answer 
1 
31 
71 
46 
11 
1 
0 
0.62 
19.25 
44.10 
28.57 
6.83 
0.62 
0 
(3) Did you know the Centre for Economic 
Research (ZEW) prior to this study?  
Yes 
No 
No answer 
82 
78 
1 
50.93 
48.45 
0.62 
(4) Which party would you vote for if the 
parliamentary elections were to be held 
next Sunday? Please bear in mind: Your 
indications will not be published or 
delivered to third party. 
CDU/CSU 
Die Linke 
FDP 
Grüne 
SPD 
Other parties 
I would not vote 
No answer 
22 
10 
14 
26 
38 
5 
26 
20 
13.66 
6.21 
8.70 
16.15 
23.60 
3.11 
16.15 
12.42 
Negative 
effects 
None 
Minor 
Average 
High 
I do not know 
No answer 
0 
8 
34 
88 
28 
3 
0 
4.97 
21.12 
54.66 
17.39 
1.86 
(5) The cultivation and 
consumption of 
genetically modified 
foods can have positive 
and negative effects on 
the environment. What 
would you estimate is the 
extent of these effects? 
Positive 
effects 
None 
Minor 
Average 
High 
I do not know 
No answer 
36 
47 
23 
7 
36 
12 
22.36 
29.19 
14.29 
4.35 
22.36 
7.45 
Negative 
effects 
None 
Minor 
Average 
High 
I do not know 
No answer 
2 
18 
32 
73 
33 
3 
1.24 
11.18 
19.88 
45.34 
20.50 
1.86 
(6) The cultivation and 
consumption of 
genetically modified 
foods can have positive 
and negative effects on 
human health. What 
would you estimate is the 
extent of these effects? 
Positive 
effects 
None 
Minor 
Average 
High 
I do not know 
No answer 
46 
42 
19 
4 
38 
12 
28.57 
26.09 
11.80 
2.48 
23.60 
7.45 
  ∑ 161 100.00 
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Table 8: Questionnaire after auctions – Part II 
Question  Answer Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Appearance of the 
package 
Unimportant 
Hardly important 
Important 
Very important 
No answer 
19 
68 
56 
12 
6 
11.80 
42.24 
34.78 
7.45 
3.73 
Taste 
Unimportant 
Hardly important 
Important 
Very important 
No answer 
1 
0 
33 
125 
2 
0.62 
0 
20.50 
77.64 
1.24 
Nutritional values, 
content of vitamins 
and minerals 
Unimportant 
Hardly important 
Important 
Very important 
No answer 
0 
9 
61 
88 
3 
0 
5.59 
37.89 
54.66 
1.86 
Free from colorants 
and preservatives, 
flavor enhancers 
and other additives 
Unimportant 
Hardly important 
Important 
Very important 
No answer 
3 
33 
56 
68 
1 
1.86 
20.50 
34.78 
42.24 
0.62 
Free from 
genetically 
manipulated 
ingredients 
Unimportant 
Hardly important 
Important 
Very important 
No answer 
2 
26 
35 
92 
6 
1.24 
16.15 
21.74 
57.14 
3.73 
Made in Germany 
Unimportant 
Hardly important 
Important 
Very important 
No answer 
34 
62 
48 
17 
0 
21.12 
38.51 
29.81 
10.56 
0 
(7) How important do 
you consider the 
following 
characteristics of food 
products to be? Please 
mark with a cross. 
Eco-friendly 
fabrication 
Unimportant 
Hardly important 
Important 
Very important 
No answer 
1 
17 
75 
67 
1 
0.62 
10.56 
46.58 
41.61 
0.62 
  ∑ 161 100.00 
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Table 9: Questionnaire after auctions – Part III 
Question  Answer Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Government 
representative 
Not trustworthy 
Hardly trustworthy 
Trustworthy 
Very trustworthy 
No answer 
45 
82 
28 
3 
3 
28 
51 
17 
2 
2 
Scientist 
Not trustworthy 
Hardly trustworthy 
Trustworthy 
Very trustworthy 
No answer 
4 
21 
88 
47 
1 
2 
13 
55 
29 
1 
Consumer 
protection 
Not trustworthy 
Hardly trustworthy 
Trustworthy 
Very trustworthy 
No answer 
1 
12 
92 
55 
1 
1 
7 
57 
34 
1 
Ecology group 
Not trustworthy 
Hardly trustworthy 
Trustworthy 
Very trustworthy 
No answer 
1 
41 
85 
32 
2 
1 
25 
53 
20 
1 
(8) Different institutions 
publish information on 
the advantages and 
disadvantages of 
genetically manipulated 
foods. How trustworthy 
do you think is this 
information by the 
following persons? 
Please mark with a cross. 
Food 
manufacturer 
Not trustworthy 
Hardly trustworthy 
Trustworthy 
Very trustworthy 
No answer 
66 
78 
9 
7 
1 
41 
48 
6 
4 
1 
  ∑ 161 100.00 
 
 
 
 
